Archive for the ‘Business Law’ Category

Jan
24

TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION CLAIMS ARISING FROM CONDUCT PREDATING THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 ARE ALLOWABLE ACCORDING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS – A WIN FOR PLAINTIFFS

On Dec. 16, 2020 in Attia, et al.  v. Google, LLC, et al.,  the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a misappropriation claim under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, §18 U.S.C. 1836, et seq. (“DTSA”) may be brought for misappropriation that started prior to the DTSA’s enactment as long as the claim also arises from post-enactment misappropriation or from the continued use of the same trade secret.

The DTSA mirrors the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) and also expands the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalizes misappropriation of certain trade secrets. Many states, including Florida, have based their trade secrets laws on the UTSA.  Until the enactment of the DTSA in 2016, trade secret misappropriation claims were generally brought under state statutes, e.g., Florida’s Uniform Trade Secret Act (“FUTSA”).

The DTSA allows plaintiffs to bring a federal claim for any trade secret misappropriation that occurred on or after May 11, 2016.   In Attiva v. Google, LLC, the Ninth Circuit decided that a claim under the DTSA can still be brought, even if the misappropriation actually started before the enactment of the DTSA, as long as the misappropriation continued through the DTSA’s enactment date (May 11, 2016) and involved the same trade secret.  In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), includes an anti-continued use provision while the DTSA lacks a similar provision.  Noting that Congress was aware of the UTSA at the time the DTSA was enacted, the court concluded that the apparently deliberate omission of an anti-continued use provision indicated that the DTSA was not intended to be limited in this way.  In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the DTSA language discussing “a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim of misappropriation” relates only to a statute of limitations argument and does not intrinsically prohibit DTSA misappropriations claim from being brought on the basis of continued use.

Although the DTSA is a relatively new statute and has not “seen” much litigation, the Attiva decision clearly expands the DTSA’s reach and is expected to be relied on by other federal courts asked to rule along the same lines.   Additionally, the decision represents a significant shift in trade secrets law which may cause more plaintiffs to commence trade secrets misappropriation actions in federal court because:

  • it allows for claims of trade secrets misappropriation to be brought under the DTSA at least in district courts “under” the Ninth Circuit even if the misappropriation began before the 2016 enactment of the DTSA;
  • it expands potential liability for defendants of trade secret claims under the DTSA;
  • it provides plaintiffs with protection where state statutes following the UTSA may not.

 

WE THANK YOU FOR READING THIS BLOG AND HOPE YOU FOUND IT INFORMATIVE.  HOWEVER, THE CONTENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.  If you have any questions about trade secret misappropriation as either a potential plaintiff or defendant, contact us for a consultation.  Also contact us for a complimentary trade secret checklist to ensure you or your company are taking the appropriate steps to protect your trade secrets.

©2021

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

(305) 279-4740

 

 

 

Jan
13

NON- DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT WORDING:  THE POTENTIAL TO IMPACT THE OUTCOME OF A PATENT-INFRINGEMENT LAW SUIT

These days, Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) templates are readily available on-line, often free-of-charge, making them an attractive alternative for many.  The problem with these templates is they are not necessarily applicable to the contracting parties’ unique circumstances and/or do not properly anticipate dealings between the parties. A poorly drafted, one-size-fits-all NDA can make or break a patent-infringement case many years into the future.   These assertions are supported by the Dec. 7, 2020 decision in Sionyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).

In Sionyx, the CAFC concluded that the district court mistakenly concluded that it lacked authority to compel the transfer of ownership of foreign patents from Hamamatsu Photonics, K.K. (Hamamatsu) to Sionyx, LLC (Sionyx).  Moreover, the lower court abused its discretion in distinguishing between the U.S. and foreign patents at issue in the case. The CAFC affirmed the district court on most other issues, including that Hamamatsu breached its non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with Sionyx, and that Sionyx was entitled to co-inventorship and sole ownership of the U.S. patents, as well as damages and an injunction.

The decision is largely based on the NDA signed by the parties in 2006.  This blog discusses the decision and emphasizes that an NDA can have consequences years later.  As the decision demonstrates, had the NDA lacked certain wording, Sionyx may well not have prevailed.

Background

In 1998, Professor Eric Mazur and his student, James Carey, discovered a novel process for creating “black silicon.” The two inventors filed a provisional patent application on May 25, 2001, from which U.S. Patent 8,080,467 ultimately issued, among other patents. Four years later in 2005, the inventors founded Sionyx and met with Hamamatsu – a company that produces silicon-based photodetector devices – a year later.  The two companies entered into an NDA to share confidential information for the purpose of “evaluating applications and joint development opportunities of pulsed laser process doped photonic devices.”

The NDA stipulated that a party receiving confidential information “shall maintain the information in strict confidence for seven years after the expiration of the agreement, after which the receiving party may use or disclose the confidential information.”  Commentator’s emphasis. The NDA also said that the receiving party of confidential information acknowledged that the disclosing party claims ownership of the information and all patent rights “in, or arising from” the confidential information.  Commentator’s emphasis.   The NDA also required that all confidential information received must be returned within 30 days of the termination of the agreement.  The term of the NDA was three years.

Hamamatsu and Sionyx worked together for about two years, at which time Hamamatsu said it wished to develop its products alone. Surprisingly, Sionyx did not request the return of any confidential information from Hamamatsu.  Hamamatsu began developing its own products and emailed Sionyx in 2009 to alert the company that it would be releasing a new photodiode at an upcoming exhibition that it did not believe infringed Sionyx’s IP or breached the confidentiality obligations. Hamamatsu then filed Japanese patent applications for photodetector devices and later filed in several other countries, including the United States, claiming priority to the Japanese patents.

One of Simony’s customers alerted the company to Hamamatsu’s U.S. patents five years later, in 2014.  When discussions between the two company’s failed, Sionyx sued Hamamatsu in the District of Massachusetts for (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) infringement of the ’467 patent; and (4) the equitable relief to transfer the foreign to Sionyx and name Carey as an inventor.

District Court Declines to Transfer Foreign Patents

A jury found in favor of Sionyx, awarding almost $800K for breaching the NDA in February 2009, when it first referred to Sionyx’s confidential information in an internal report, and almost $600K in damages for unjust enrichment. The jury also found that Carey should be added as a co-inventor to the U.S. patents. At the post-trial motion stage, the district court then granted Sionyx sole ownership of the disputed U.S. patents, injunctions on Hamamatsu’s accused products practicing those patents and the ’467 patent, pre- and post-judgment interest on damages for breach of contract, and pre-judgment interest on damages for unjust enrichment. The court denied Sionyx’s motions for ownership of the disputed foreign patents because it was uncertain that it had jurisdiction to grant ownership of foreign patents and because Sionyx had failed to adequately identify the foreign patents for which it was requesting ownership.

Sionyx appealed the district court’s decision to refrain from transferring the foreign patents.  The CAFC agreed with Sionyx, holding that “the evidence that established Sionyx’s right to sole ownership of the Disputed (Hamamatsu) U.S. Patents also applies to the Disputed Foreign Patents.” The decision added:

As we discussed above with respect to the Disputed (Hamamatsu) U.S. Patents, we agree that the jury’s findings compel the conclusion that those patents arose from Sionyx’s confidential information and that Hamamatsu has not shown that it contributed [its own] confidential information entitling it to joint ownership. And because the Disputed U.S. Patents claim priority from Hamamatsu’s Japanese patent applications, the Japanese applications must be for the same inventions as the Disputed U.S. Patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(a). Thus, Hamamatsu’s Japanese patent applications and any applications claiming priority from the Japanese applications in other countries must also have arisen from Sionyx’s confidential information.

Simply put, the CAFC found that Hamamatsu’s Japanese and U.S. patents emanated from Sionyx’s confidential information which Hamamatsu became privy to under the terms of the 2005 NDA.  According to the court, Hamamatsu itself never provided its own confidential information to Sionyx, which might have justified joint inventorship of the patent with Cary as the jury had concluded.

Abuse of Discretion Standard

Accordingly, Sionyx was entitled to sole ownership of the Japanese applications and any foreign applications claiming priority therefrom. The CAFC further explained that “it is well established that courts have authority to compel parties properly before them to transfer ownership of foreign patents, just as they would any other equitable remedy,” since such an order is “an exercise of the court’s authority over the party, not the foreign patent office in which the assignment is made.” As such, the district court abused its discretion in distinguishing between the two groups of patents.

The CAFC denied Sionyx’s motion for fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 on cross-appeal, declined to address the issue of willfulness, and affirmed the following findings by the district court: a) Hamamatsu breached the NDA; b) Sionyx is entitled to the damages and pre-judgment interest awarded by the jury, as well as post-judgment interest at the statutory rate for its breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims; c) Carey is a co-inventor of Hamamtsu’s U.S. Patents; Sionyx is entitled to an injunction prohibiting Hamamatsu from practicing its U.S. Patents for breach of the NDA; and d) Sionyx is entitled to an injunction prohibiting Hamamatsu from practicing its 467 patent.

Conclusions

The outcome may well have been different had the NDA not “directed” the ownership of all future patents emanating from Sionyx’s confidential information to Sionyx.   Furthermore, any resulting patent relying on confidential information emanating from both parties should have designated both Cary and an Hamamtsu inventor as joint inventors no matter where the patent applications were filed.  Inventorship does not, however, mean that the inventor(s) is also the owner(s) of the patent.  Generally, R&D and engineering personnel who work for companies assign any patent rights they may have over to their employer-company (e.g., Hamamtsu).  Or, where inventors establish a business entity, the inventors often assign their patent-related interests over to the company as part of their capital contribution.  (e.g., Sionyx).

As this case illustrates, an NDA can be a critical factor in determining patent (and other IP) ownership.  An NDA should be tailor-made for the particular situation at hand with particular emphasis on protecting the disclosing party which is often an individual inventor or a small start-up company.  Anticipate problems into the future since patents in particular can take several years to issue meaning that infringement lawsuits, patent ownership disputes, etc. may occur many years down the road.  It is also important that the disclosing party take steps consistent with protecting its confidential information upon early termination of the NDA or expiration by time.  For example, it is not clear why Sionyx did not insist on the return of all its confidential information when Hamamatsu indicated negotiations were over.

Take Home Points

1. Do not presume a generic NDA template will adequately protect your interests.  An NDA should reflect the parties’ particular situation and the nature of their business relationship under which confidential information may be disclosed.

2. Know and follow the procedures required of you and your company in the NDA as the Disclosing or Receiving Party.

Contact Susan at 305-279-4740 on matters related to your NDA to ensure it addresses potential scenarios consistent with the particular circumstances involving the contracting parties.   We are here to serve you and answer your questions related to intellectual property & business law in both transactional matters and litigation.  Check her reviews at AVVO.com where she has received Client’s Choice Badges for both 2019 and 2020.  She is a registered patent attorney.

WE THANK YOU FOR READING THIS BLOG AND HOPE YOU FOUND IT INFORMATIVE.  HOWEVER, THE CONTENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.

 

©2021

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

(305) 279-4740

 

 

Jan
12

COPYRIGHT LAW UPDATE

THE CASE ACT OF DECEMBER 2020 CREATES A SIMPLER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS PROCESS FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS & OTHER CREATIVES

The Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Act (the CASE Act) became law on Dec. 27, 2020 and is a welcome alternative to expensive federal court lawsuits by individual creators and small businesses (Creators) across the country who all too frequently have their copyrighted works infringed.   Prior to the Act, all copyright right infringement claims had to be brought in federal court, effectively discouraging many Creators from suing infringers due to the high costs involved.  Additionally, federal court copyright cases are generally very complex and can go on for a long time, further adding to the legal costs and plaintiffs’ frustration.   As a result, infringements regularly went unchallenged, leading many Creators or the small business owners of the Creators’ works to feel disenfranchised by the copyright system.  In effect, these individuals/businesses had rights but no reasonable remedies.

Rather than file a federal court lawsuit, Creators will now be able to bring their infringement claims before a Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”) within the U.S. Copyright Office – a three-member panel of experts on copyright law.   The panel will have the right to award, e.g., photographers, up to $15,000.00 per work and $30,000.00 per claim, assuming the works have been registered with the office.  For unregistered photos, the amount of the award is reduced by fifty percent.  In addition to monetary penalties, the Board could also issue a notice to the infringer to cease the infringement.

The commentator notes that a copyright infringement action brought in federal court requires that the work has actually been registered with the U.S. Copyright office.   See the March 4, 2019 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com. It is not clear why this requirement is not required for a CCB proceeding.  The commentator still recommends that a creator secure a registered copyright by filing for copyright registration within 90 days of publication to take advantage of the potentially greater monetary award provided by the CCB for registered works, or, in the alternative to have the option of a proceeding in federal court.

The CCB officers are appointed by the Library of Congress.  The candidates must have demonstrated expertise in copyright law.  For example, they must have represented or presided over a diversity of copyright interests, including those of both owners and users of copyrighted works.   This helps to ensure that the officers are fair and unbiased.

Another problem with federal copyright infringement cases is that the judges cannot usually be expected to be subject matter experts in this complex area of the law.  This lack of consistency in judicial background and experience has led to inconsistent copyright infringement decisions across jurisdictions or even within the same jurisdiction.  Since the CCB experts will be subject matter experts, the expectation is that the decisions will lead to more consistently correct decisions than in federal courts.  Hopefully, the CCB’s decisions will be published so they can be relied on in federal court cases.

There are numerous other provisions in the CASE Act beyond the scope of this Law Update.   Contact us to discuss your options in bringing a copyright infringement claim under the CASE Act.  We would be honored to represent creatives in their quest to protect the fruits of their creativity at a one-time flat fee.

WE THANK YOU READING THIS BLOG AND HOPE YOU FOUND IT INFORMATIVE.  HOWEVER, THE CONTENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.  IF YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION THAT MAY HAVE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

 

©2021

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

(305) 279-4740

 

 

 

 

Jan
03

IMPORTANT TRADEMARK LAW UPDATE: The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020

The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”) was signed into law by President Trump on Dec. 27, 2020 as part of the COVID-19 relief and government funding package.  This article summarizes the several significant benefits provided to trademark owners under the TMA.

  1. Presumption of Irreparable Harm to a Trademark Owner by an Infringer

The TMA makes it easier for a trademark owner to obtain injunctive relief against an infringer. Prior to the new law, trademark owners were required to prove that they will be “irreparably harmed” if the infringer is not enjoined from further use of the infringing mark.  Now, as long as the owner can demonstrate infringement, the owner will enjoy a legal presumption that the harm caused by continued infringement will be irreparable, thereby increasing the owner’s likelihood of obtaining injunctive relief.   Many times, an owner’s main goal is simply to stop the infringement through injunction rather than proceed with an expensive drawn-out trial.  The TMA should help facilitate this objective.

  1. Trademark Applications Originating from Outside the United States

A couple of years ago the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) made it an administrative requirement that foreign trademark applicants must be represented by a U.S. licensed attorney. This was done to help reduce fraud on the USPTO by some foreign applicants whose applications too often indicated that they were actually using their marks in the United States, a requirement under U.S. law, when in fact they were not.

The TMA now tackles this on-going problem legislatively.  Due to on-going concern regarding the proliferation of applications and registrations (particularly emanating from China) for trademarks that are not actually in use in United States commerce, the TMA also calls for the USPTO to implement new procedures that will allow third parties to more readily challenge pending applications and issued registrations that may be suspect.  Under current practice, challenges to pending applications are limited in scope, and challenges to registrations require costly cancellation proceedings.  The commentator has successfully represented clients in cancellation proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board which generally involve adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   And yes, these proceedings can take a while to complete.

A potential bona fide trademark applicant may find that a third party has a registered mark that will likely prevent registration of the applicant’s mark on likelihood of confusion grounds.  The applicant could attempt to obtain cancellation of the registered mark, but again such a proceeding can be costly and take a long time.  The TMA provides streamlined procedure for challenging issued registrations.

The TMA also calls for a broadening of the scope of evidence that a third party may submit for consideration by the examining attorney during examination of another pending application (including evidence of non-use).  Both changes will help clear the way for legitimate trademark users to obtain registration of their marks.

Finally, the TMA requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study regarding the problem of false and inaccurate claims of use in trademark applications and registrations, and to report to Congress recommendations based on the results of the study as to any changes to trademark law that will improve the accuracy of the Trademark Register or reduce inaccurate or false claims of use.

  1. Take-Home Points
  • Foreign trademark applicants need to understand that the U.S.’s requirement for bona fide trademark use within the U.S. is a requirement for both obtaining registration of the mark and maintaining registration of the mark. Any foreign trademark applicant should utilize the services of a U.S. trademark attorney who will presumably require proof of usage in the U.S. as part of the documentation provided to the USPTO.
  • Thanks to the TMA, trademark applicants now have more options to contest suspect registrations. This can be particularly beneficial to smaller business owners by reducing the overall costs involved.
  • Thanks to the TMA, registered trademark owners need not prove irreparable harm to obtain an injunction providing the other elements are met. Again, this can be particularly beneficial to smaller business owners by reducing the overall costs involved.

Questions About Trademark Matters?

Contact Susan Troy at 305-279-4740 for legal matters involving trademark applications and trademark infringement.  We are here to serve you and answer your questions related to intellectual property & business law.  See her reviews at www.avvo.com where she has received Client’s Choice Badges for both 2019 and 2020.  She is also a registered patent attorney.

 

WE THANK YOU READING THIS BLOG AND HOPE YOU FOUND IT INFORMATIVE.  HOWEVER, THE CONTENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.  IF YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION THAT MAY HAVE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY.

 

©2021

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

(305) 279-4740

 

 

Nov
15

A REJECTION OF PATENT CLAIMS BY THE USPTO BASED ON ANALOGOUS ART REQUIRES PROPER ANALYSIS UNDER THE CORRECT STANDARD

Posted by Susan Dierenfeldt-Troy, Esq.

Troy & Schwartz, LLC

Where Legal Meets Entrepreneurship™

Patent claims may be rejected on anticipatory grounds under 35 U.S.C § 102 and/or on obviousness grounds under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  This blog discusses the USPTO’s obligations when making rejections on obviousness grounds, an area of patent law that can be particularly confusing as a November 9, 2020 decision by the CAFC demonstrates.

Background

In order for a reference to be proper for use in an obviousness rejection, the reference must be analogous art to the claimed invention.   This does not require that the reference be from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention, in light of the Supreme Court’s instruction that “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.”  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).  Rather, a reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if:  (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention).   However, in order for a reference to be “reasonably pertinent” to the problem, it must “logically have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering the problem.”  In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The Case

These requirements were re-visited by the U.S. Court of Appeals (CAFC) in its Nov. 9, 2020 decision in Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC.  Donner had petitioned the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) for an inter partes review (IPR) of U.S.  patent no. 6,459,023 (the ‘023 patent), asserting that the various claims of the ‘023 patent were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of U.S. Patent No. 3,504,311 (Mullen).  The ‘023 patent is directed to guitar effects pedals, electronic devices that affect the amplified sound of a guitar.  The specification explained that there was a need for “ ‘an improved pedals effect board which  allows easy positioning and changing of the individual guitar effects while providing a confined and secured area for cable routing and placement.’ ”

The Mullen reference related to electrical relays where an “ ‘object of the invention is to provide an improved support for supporting one or more relay structures and for providing wiring-channel space for receiving wires that would be connected to the relay structures to connect the relay structures in various controlled structures.’ ”  Donner contended that figures in the Muller patent depict a structure that is analogous to the structure claimed in the ‘023 patent which includes surfaces for mounting relays, cable connection openings, and areas for accommodating routing cables.

The PTAB found in favor of Pro Stage Gear, finding that Donner had not shown that Mullen falls within the scope of analogous art under either of the two tests.  On appeal to the CAFC, the parties did not dispute that the 023 patent and Mullen were not from the same field of endeavor.  The only issue on appeal was whether Mullen was “reasonably pertinent to one or more particular problems to which the ‘023 patent relates.”

The CAFC found that the PTAB had failed to establish whether it had meaningfully considered all of the evidence Donner had put forth, including expert testimony, to try and establish that Mullen was reasonably pertinent to the problems faced by the 023 patent’s inventor.   Additionally, the PTAB also failed to “properly identify and compare the purposes to which Mullen and the ’23 patent relate.”

Proper analysis requires that the “problems to which the claimed invention and reference relate must be identified and compared from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art.”  Making conclusory statements without more is insufficient to determine whether a reference is analogous art.  Here, the PTAB merely asserted that the ordinary skilled person would have a “relatively low level of skill and would have had “a poor understanding of Mullen’s relay technology.”  Interestingly, the PTAB had acknowledged that there may be “ ‘pertinent similarities between Mullen and the ‘023 patent but concluded that those similarities, even if credited, did ‘not establish why a person of ordinary skill would have considered a reference from a different technology and time.’ ”  The CAFC disagreed, explaining that such a person may consult a reference.  The issue is not whether the person would have understood every last detail of a reference but “whether she understood portions of the reference relevant to solving the problem well enough to glean useful information.”

The CAFC concluded that the PTAB had applied the wrong analogous art standard.  It declined to hold that “no reasonable fact finder could conclude under the reasonably pertinent standard, that Mullen is not analogous art.”  Instead, it vacated the PTAB’s decision and remanded for consideration of the proper standard for analogous art.

Conclusion

Here is a simple example of analogous art.  An inventor files a patent application for a collapsible ski pole and the examining attorney cites analogous prior art for a collapsible tent pole patent. Here the tent pole patent would likely be reasonably pertinent to the problem the ski pole inventor was trying to solve: to provide less unwieldy, more readily transported poles.   Whether or not the ski pole will qualify for patent protection will depend on structural differences between the two poles and whether any ski pole structure would have been obvious over the prior art.

The patents at issue in the Donner matter of course involve more complex structures than the ski pole/tent example.  Whether or not Mullen, an invention from the 1970s, is reasonably pertinent to the problem the guitar pedal effects patent was trying to solve will now be assessed by the PTAB using evidence and expert testimony.   If yes, then the PTAB will evaluate whether the ‘023 patent is obvious over the Mullen patent.   Unfair in this situation? Is it likely that the ‘023 patent inventor found and “used” what was shown in the Mullen patent for a structure related to improving guitar effects pedals? The PTAB’s first decision suggested that it was not “pleased” with this particular IPR.  The 023 invention must have value in the market place for Donner to have spent the money involved so far on legal fees to try and invalidate the ‘023 patent.   Stay tuned for an update on the PTAB’s new decision.

Take Home Points

Whether dealing with the prosecution of a patent application or an IPR proceeding involving an existing patent, the USPTO must apply the appropriate standards in considering analogous prior art. Failure of the USPTO to do so during patent application prosecution can provide the patent applicant with the opportunity to try and overcome the USPTO’s reliance on the cited analogous prior art.  In an IPR proceeding, failure of the PTAB to properly apply the two analogous art tests may well result in an appeal of the matter to the CAFC as in the Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC matter by the losing party in the IPR proceeding.   

 

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST IN THIS BLOG.  AS USUAL THE CONTENT IS FOR   INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE.

Call us at (305) 279-4740 for a complimentary consultation on matters related to obtaining patent protection or handling a legal dispute before the PTAB or the CAFC.  

 

May you and your loved ones stay safe & be well during these challenging times.


© 2020 by Troy & Schwartz, LLC

 

 

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